This paper gives the e ect of side-information, obtained by the opponent through an initial reconciliation step, on the size of the secret-key that can be distilled safely by subsequent privacy ampliÿcation in unconditionally secure secret-key agreement protocol based on smooth entropy, and obtains the size of the secret-key. ?
Introduction
The security of many presently used cryptosystems, for example all public-key cryptographic schemes, is based on the assumed hardness of computational problems in number theory such as the integer-factoring problem or the problem of computing discrete logarithms in certain ÿnite cyclic groups. Such a cryptosystem is called computationally secure.
Practical computational security is always conditional and additionally faces the risk of being broken by progress in the theory of e cient algorithms or in hardware engineering. On the other hand, it appears desirable from both a scientiÿc and practical point of view to design a cryptosystem whose security is not based on any assumptions and can be proven rigorously. So, such security proofs must be based on information theory rather than complexity theory.
Unconditionally secure secret-key agreement [1] [2] [3] [4] 6 ] takes place in a scenario where Alice, Bob, and an adversary, Eve, know the correlated random variable X; Y , and Z, respectively, distributed according to some joint probability distribution that may be under the partial control of Eve. It is possible for Alice and Bob to agree a secret-key over an authentic public channel even when Eve's channel is superior to Alice's and Bob's channel. The system can usually be divided into three phases:
Advantage distillation: This phase is needed when neither Alice nor Bob has an advantage over Eve, i.e., neither I (X ; Y ) ¿ I(X ; Z) nor I (Y ; X ) ¿ I(Y ; Z). After this phase, a sequence of messages is summarized in a random variable C. Alice can compute a string W from X and C about which Bob has less uncertainty than Eve:
Information reconciliation: Alice and Bob exchange redundant information and apply error-correction techniques in order for Bob to be able to learn W with very high probability but such that Eve is left only with incomplete information about it. Generally, Alice can send a bit string U whose length L is slightly larger than
Privacy ampliÿcation: Alice and Bob distill from W a shorter string K about which Eve has only a negligible amount of information. For instance, Alice and Bob publicly agree on a universal hash function [5] f, and choose K = f(W ) as their secret key.
Cachin [2, 3] investigated privacy ampliÿcation by using smooth entropy, in this paper, we give the e ect of side-information that Eve obtains during information reconciliation on smooth entropy.
Some fundamental deÿnitions and conclusions
We repeat some fundamental deÿnitions and conclusions in this section. All logarithms in this paper are to the base 2. Random variables are denoted by capital letter, the alphabet of a random variable is denoted by the corresponding script letter, the cardinality of a set X is denoted by |X|. The expected value of a real-valued random variable X is denoted by E[X ].
A useful bound for any real-valued random variable X , any t ∈ R + , and any r ∈ R (R is the set of real numbers ) is
The Shannon entropy of a random variable X with probability distribution P X and alphabet X is deÿned as
The conditional entropy of X conditioned on a random variable Y is
where H (X | Y = y) denotes the entropy of the conditional probability distribution P X | Y =y .
The relative entropy between two probability distributions P X ; P Y with same alphabet X is deÿned as
The RÃ enyi entropy of order of X is
for ¿ 0 and = 1. Because the limiting case of RÃ enyi entropy for → 1 is Shannon entropy, we can extend the deÿnition to H 1 (X ) = H (X ). In the other limiting case → ∞, we obtain the min-entropy, deÿned as
For a ÿxed random variable X , RÃ enyi entropy is a continuous positive decreasing function of . For 0 ¡ ¡ ÿ,
with equality if and only if X is uniformly distributed over some subset of X. In particular, log|X| ¿ H (X ) ¿ 0 for ¿ 0 and H (X ) ¿ H (X ) for ¿ 1.
Consider a random variable X , we want to apply a smoothing function f : X → Y to X such that Y = f(X ) is uniformly distributed over its range Y. The largest size of Y such that Y is still su ciently uniform is a measure for the amount of smooth entropy inherent in X , relative to the allowed deviation from perfect uniformity. To quantify this deviation we use a nonuniformity measure M that associates with every random variable X a positive number M (X ) that is 0 if and only if P X is the uniform distribution P U (x) over X. The example for M is relative entropy D(P X P U ). Formally, Deÿnition (Cachin [2, 3] ). Let M be a nonuniformity measure and let : R → R be a decreasing nonnegative function. A random variable X with alphabet X has smooth entropy (X ) within (s) (in terms of M ) with probability 1 − if (X ) is maximum of all such that for any security parameter s ¿ 0, there exist a random variable T and a function f : X × T → Y with |Y | = 2 −s such that there is a failure event E that has probability at most , and the expected value over T of the nonuniformity M of Y = f(X; T ), given T and E, is at most (s). Formally,
The principle method for extracting smooth entropy is based on universal hashing. A universal hash function [5] is a set F of functions: A → B such that for ∀x 1 ; x 2 ∈ A with x 1 = x 2 , there are at most |F | = | B| function f in F such that f(x 1 ) = f(x 2 ).
The following two lemmas show that RÃ enyi entropy of order 2 and Shannon entropy cannot di er arbitrarily for probability distributions where p min = min x∈X P X (x); p max = max x∈X P X (x); p min and p max are a constant factor apart.
Lemma 1 (Cachin [2, 3] ). Let X be a random variable with alphabet X and distribution P X ; p max 6 cp min , for some c ¿ 1. Then
If the minimum and maximum probability in a distribution P X do not di er by more than a constant factor, then the RÃ enyi entropy of order 2 of X is at most a constant below the Shannon entropy.
Lemma 2 (Cachin [2, 3] ). Let X; p min ; p max , and c are the same as Lemma 1, then
The following theorem shows how smooth entropy is lower bounded by RÃ enyi entropy of order for any 1 ¡ ¡ 2.
Theorem 1 (Cachin [2, 3] ). Fix r; t ¿ 0, let m be an integer such that m − log(m + 1) ¿ log| X | + t, and let s be the security parameter for smooth entropy. For any 1 ¡ ¡ 2, the smooth entropy of a random variable X within 2 −s =ln 2 in terms of relative entropy with probability 1 − 2 −r − 2 −t is lower bounded by RÃ enyi entropy of order in the sense that (X ) ¿ H (X ) − log(m + 1) − r=( − 1) − t − 2.
3. The e ect of side-information on smooth entropy and the size of distilled secret key Theorem 2. Let X be a random variable with alphabet X and distribution P X ; f be a deterministic function of X , and U = f(X ) with alphabet U. Then with probability 1 − 2 −r , we have
where r is the same as in Theorem 1.
Proof. Since f is a deterministic function of X , and U = f(X ), it follows that
Interpreting H (X | U = u) as a function of u, the equation above is equivalent to
Let r be the same as in Theorem 1,
Theorem 3. Let 1 ¡ ¡ 2; X; U; X; U are the same as in Theorem 2, p min = min u∈U P U (u), p max = max u∈U P U (u), and p max 6 c · p min for 1 ¡ c 6 (the fourth inequality follows from Lemma1):
From |P U (u) − PU | ¡ ÿ PU , we have
with probability at least 1 − ÿ −2 . Combining the bounds in (1) and (3), it follows that
with probability at least (
After advantage distilling, let W be a string about which both Alice and Bob have more information than Eve, V be the summary of Eve's total knowledge about W and v be a particular value of V observed by Eve. In the deÿnition of smooth entropy and Theorem 1, P X is replaced by P W | V =v , it is showed that Alice and Bob can agree an l-bit key K = G(W ) where G is chosen at random from a universal class of hash functions W → {0; 1} l , l = H (W | V = v) − log(m + 1) − r − 1 − t − 2 − s with probability 1 − 2 −r − 2 −t , and Eve's information about K 6 2 −s =ln 2, where s is the security parameter for smooth entropy.
In Theorem 3, substituting P X and P X | U =u by P W | V =v and P W | V =v; U =u , we have the conclusion of this paper.
Conclusion
Let U be side-information that Eve obtains during information reconciliation, W; U; K; G be the same as above, then with probability (1−2 −r −2 −t )(1−2 −r −ÿ −2 ), the size of secret-key distilled by Alice and Bob is H (W | V = v) − log(m + 1) − r=( − 1) − t − 2 − s − (bits), and Eve's information about K 6 2 −s =ln 2, where = H (U ) − log(1 − ÿ √ c 3 − 1) + r=( − 1); 1 ¡ ¡ 2; 1 ¡ c 6 3 √ 2; r ¿ 0; t ¿ 0; 1 6 ÿ 6 1= √ c 3 − 1, m is an integer such that m − log(m + 1) ¿ log |X| + t, and s is the security parameter for smooth entropy.
